Slavery, Revolution and Political Strategy: Lessons from the International Campaign to Abolish the Slave Trade
Early in 1788, Jacques Brissot founded a society in Paris which later became known as the Amis des Noirs. It was modeled after the London Committee for the abolition of the slave trade. The campaign to abolish the slave trade was international in scope. If pressure was to be successfully applied on the nations which participated in the trade, collaboration between national advocacy groups was essential. But while the London Committee and the Amis des Noirs were similar in some respects and their relations were very close and cordial for some time, there were also striking differences in the way they defined their objectives, their organization, their political context and the way in which they responded to it, and the ability or determination of their leadership to make the most of their opportunities.
Although international collaboration held great promise, it also could make their task more difficult, especially when it cut across powerful nationalistic and revolutionary (or anti-revolutionary) programs. The differences and relations between the two groups raise important issues with obvious contemporary relevance. How narrowly should organizations define their institutional goals? What role should the prospects for success have in this process of definition? How close should their collaboration be? What impact can differences in organizational strength have on the prospects for successful collaboration? The account in this paper considers the light that the relations between the London Committee and the Amis des Noirs casts on these questions. ***** James Phillips, Quaker publisher and founding member of the London Committee, wrote to his friend Brissot in February 1793, immediately after France had declared war on Britain: 'Remember that the cause of the Africans was the beginning of thy political career. -I am not afraid of thy deserting it -but the best of us stand in need of an occasional Phillips was never backward about reminding Brissot of what duty demanded. At the start of the revolution, he upbraided him on hearing from him that he 'had laid aside the prosecution of the Blacks being wholly taken up with your own liberties & the arrangement of your municipal governments/ 3 The tension felt by many French abolitionists during the Revolution between pressing their campaign to end the slave trade, on the one hand, and securing the nation's constitution and its economic stability, on the other, surfaced more than once. Early in 1790, for example, Condorçet took issue with Brissot whose priorities at the time were ordered more to Phillips's liking. He argued that it would be imprudent in France's circumstances to press vigorously for abolition. 4 Such a campaign would divide the nation when its basic structures were vulnerable. The National Assembly, he shrewdly added, was weak on colonial issues, and abolitionists would be targeted if trouble erupted between colonists and blacks. Phillips, for his part, believed that no more favorable opportunity for achieving abolition was likely to arise. France's constitutional objectives, he argued, could scarcely be achieved by assigning to abolition a lower priority. He added in his February 1793, letter: 'The Cause of the Blacks is so intimately connected with the general cause of liberty that they cannot be disjoined even in idea.'
The friendship between Phillips and Brissot was long-standing and close. Soon after Brissot learned of the founding of the London Committee in 1787, he wrote to Phillips to ask him to secure his appointment as its Paris agent. 6 At the time, Brissot was preoccupied with both slavery and the slave trade. His Examen critique, published in 1786, incorporated a defense of blacks and a call for the abolition of slavery. In 1787, at a meeting of the Société Gallo-Américain, co-founded by him to encourage the development of a correspondence and trade between America and France, he gave notice that he would introduce a plan to abolish slavery at a forthcoming meeting. 7 In another work from the same period, he forecast that Europeans, shamed by their participation in the slave trade, would soon act to end it.
The Société Gallo-Américain, like so many of Brissot's visionary projects, would collapse, but his approach to the London Committee was the event which Phillips characterized as the start of his political career. The London Committee actively encouraged international cooperation to abolish the slave trade. Its president, Granville Sharp, wrote to Brissot soon after he made his initial approach to the Committee: 'having embarked in this cause not simply as Englishmen but as Citizens of the World... we consider our plan as extending to the whole world and shall not be compleated till these flagrant violations of the rights of mankind universally cease/ 9 The Committee believed that if France joined England in abolishing the trade, others would inevitably follow. 10 It was an argument with considerable appeal for reformers on both sides of the channel. Mirabeau, whose Analyse des papiers anglois became the organ for French abolitionists before the Revolution, wrote enthusiastically to Brissot about the desirability of establishing 'une coalition des philanthropes François et des philanthropes Anglois/ 11 Brissot needed no convincing.
William Wilberforce was equally impressed by the argument for international cooperation. He was aware that his opponents would argue that if Britain withdrew from the trade, France would fill the vacuum at the cost of Britain's maritime hegemony. With Pitt's blessing, he enlisted William Eden to approach the French government to sound out its willingness to make a conditional commitment to abolish the slave trade if Parliament were to support abolition. The French government, however, was unmoved. It feared that if it conditionally promised to abolish the slave trade and Parliament balked, it would expose itself to irresistible pressure to honor its commitment unilaterally. Wilberforce considered traveling to France to put his case directly, but was persuaded not to do so. 15 He was forced to defend his position in Parliament without any prior assurance that France would follow suit, but he continued to consider ways for enlisting active French cooperation, although, by the time of the Revolution, he no longer favored an international treaty as the vehicle for achieving abolition. He became convinced that the negotiation would be used as a delaying tactic and would undermine the political credibility of other strategies for achieving the desired end. 16 While the London Committee promoted international collaboration, it also wanted to maintain its organizational distance from other groups and was not keen to foster the kind of links Brissot proposed to it. It responded coldly to his proposal that he should act as its Paris agent and collect subscriptions in France on its behalf. Instead it encouraged him to form an independent committee to promote the abolition of the slave trade. 17 It cited the very different conditions in France in justification of its decision.
What Brissot wanted primarily, however, was formal recognition and he readily agreed to the London Committee's proposal. In his organizing efforts, he consistently emphasized that he acted at the London Committee's request and he promised to make his society as like it as possible. After he successfully formed the Paris Society, he drew attention to the advantages of close liaison between the two groups on objectives and modes of proceeding. He even advocated formal affiliation between them.
18 At one stage early in the Revolution, the Amis des Noirs hoped to persuade the London Committee to circulate a petition to be presented to the National Assembly. Phillips responded coldly: It is certainly a new scheme for the subjects of one country to petition the legislature of another & we cannot perceive any ground for hope of its being attended with any good/ 19 The London Committee was blunter. Such an action would be regarded as 'officious and unwelcome interference.' 20 Although the London Committee resisted attempts to unify the two groups, the ties were close and, for a time, very much so. Until 1791 the London Committee invariably noted the progress of the Amis des Noirs in its periodic reports. 21 It translated and arranged for the publication of some of its brochures. 22 The Amis des Noirs returned the compliment. At this stage the achievements of the one group were viewed as highly useful vehicles by the other for advancing its case. Later their close relations would be exploited by their enemies to embarrass them both.
The members of the London Committee were passionately opposed to slavery as well as to the slave trade. The Quaker, Joseph Woods, for example, had earlier argued for the immediate abolition of the slave trade and the gradual emancipation of slaves. 23 The London Committee, however, deliberately narrowed its scope to abolition and resolved to take no position on emancipation. On this fundamental issue, it did not waver.
Woods explained to an American correspondent that the Committee adopted this policy because the abolition of slavery was a long term objective at best '& possibly cannot originate here without interfering with the legislative rights of the colonies.' 24 Clarkson, recollecting the debate at the London Committee, remarked: It appeared... to be the sense of the committee, that to aim at the removal of both would be to aim at too much, and that by doing this we might lose all/ 25 He later argued more aggressively to a French correspondent: 'We are of opinion that the Emancipation of the Slaves would be of no benefit to them at present, would ruin some of their proprietors, would endanger the revenue for a time and would be an Evil rather than a Good/ 26 He aimed to convince the public, including planters who relied on slavery, not only of the immorality, but equally of the impolicy of the slave trade.
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Separating abolition from emancipation made his position more plausible.
This deliberate narrowing of focus to the slave trade was crucial, if the London Committee was to function effectively as a tightly organized, limited-membership ginger group, acting in close support of the parliamentary effort to abolish the slave trade. Its organizational backbone was a group of Quakers with considerable experience petitioning Parliament on slavery and the slave trade.
28 They and the London Committee to which they belonged, however, were constitutionally conservative unlike some other extra-parliamentary political organizations established at the time. Their aim was to make the existing political structure function for their cause, not to change or threaten it.
The Amis des Noirs, whether at the time of its founding before the Revolution or after its outbreak, functioned in a different political context, although, after the Revolution, it attempted -albeit unsuccessfully -to adapt the parliamentary tactics which had been so successfully used in Britain in the National Assembly. 29 Its constitution did not reflect a wish to imitate the tight structure of the London Committee. Nor was its leadership, and Brissot very notably, tempted to accept the principle of constitutional conservatism as a constraint on its position.
The critical difference between the two groups, however, was the way they defined their objectives. For, despite Brissot's pronouncements about imitating the London Committee, he committed the Amis des Noirs from the outset to long-term emancipation. 30 Brissot went farther and carelessly implied that the London Committee shared the same goal.
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This difference in objectives was reflected in a difference in style of argument. Clarkson, writing for the London Committee, essentially limited himself to utilitarian arguments which relied on his extensive knowledge of how the slave trade functioned. Brissot, on the other hand, derived his position directly from abstract philosophical principles of liberty and equality. 32 His stance made it difficult for the Amis des Noirs to retreat to more limited objectives when it later wished to focus exclusively on the slave trade.
The Adresse à rassemblée nationale, pour l'abolition de la Traite des Noirs of January 1790, which attempted to persuade the National Assembly to form a committee to investigate the slave trade, tried to blunt the force of this commitment to emancipation. In it Brissot claimed that emancipation was not the purpose of the Amis des Noirs. 33 He was trying to refocus the objective of the Amis des Noirs on the abolition of the slave trade and, at the same time, to blunt the relentless attacks against it, which, as in England, focused on emancipation. In light of its policy statements, the Amis des Noirs was not well placed to defend itself against such attacks.
Other more stylistic differences between the London Committee and the Amis des Noirs are reflected in personal differences between Brissot and Clarkson, although they did not prevent each from holding the other in the highest personal regard. 34 Clarkson was intellectually cautious, careful not to claim more than he could justify on the available evidence. He was clear, if didactic, thorough in his research, personally at ease in a variety of social worlds, with impeccable integrity, courageous, and single-minded. He had considerable leadership ability and he was imaginative about devising strategies for advancing his cause. In Paris, he, not the Amis des Noirs, enjoyed free access to Necker and through him to the King. Again, he, not the Amis des Noirs, thoroughly interviewed Geoffrey de Villeneuve, a French officer who accompanied the Swedish explorer and visionary C.B. Wadstrom a few years earlier to Senegal and who had a highly detailed knowledge of the French slave trade. Clarkson transcribed and published Villeneuve's evidence. 35 Brissot, while not wanting courage, was mercurial. He relied on rhetoric and his immense, if scattered energy. He was constantly in financial trouble, proposing grandiose projects he had no reasonable hope of carrying out. His optimism consistently led him to overestimate the prospects for success, and while Clarkson shared this optimism, it did not lead him, by contrast, to leave any stone unturned to enhance the prospects for success. 36 Brissot's background on the fringes of the illegal book trade, moreover, made him personally vulnerable and his publications on the slave trade progressively became exercises in self-justification.
Until the Revolution, it would have been rational to anticipate that Britain would abolish the slave trade before France. The London Committee was very successful in influencing public opinion through its publications, its research, and its organizational energy. It had powerful parliamentary friends. It was also well-funded in its early years. The Amis des Noirs tried to emulate it, but public opinion was not as advanced in France. Despite the personal distinction of many of its supporters, it was constantly short of money; its independent research effort was unimpressive; and its organization was weak.
The Revolution, however, reversed these expectations. Clarkson's motive for going to France was to assist the Amis des Noirs to press for abolition in the dramatically changed political circumstances. Revolutionary France, as he saw it, was under an obligation to act even without commitments from other nations to follow its example. The scope of its Declaration of the Rights of Man could not be limited to metropolitan France, but he stopped short of drawing the emancipationist conclusions to which this argument inevitably led. As knowledge of the Revolution and its principles spread, the only choices for France would be either to abolish the slave trade and improve conditions for slaves, or face rebellion. 37 Success in France, he believed, would place great political pressure on Parliament to act likewise.
When Clarkson arrived in Paris, he was warmly greeted. Le Patriote François noted that he had come to cement the ties between the London Committee and the Amis des Noirs and, more significantly, to give the latter's efforts a boost with whatever assistance he could offer, financial included. 38 Clarkson soon observed, however, that the meetings of the Amis des Noirs were held irregularly, that they were infiltrated by slave owning interests and that they were desperately short of funds to mount an effective campaign to place the slave trade on the National Assembly's agenda. 39 He decided to work independently of it, but in collaboration with some of its leading members.
Clarkson was a forceful presence in France. This fact clearly reflected the leadership and organizational weakness of Brissot and the Amis des Noirs. It is inconceivable that a French abolitionist would have enjoyed a comparable standing in Britain. Unsurprisingly, Clarkson and the London Committee became, with the Amis des Noirs, targets of furious attack by proponents of the slave trade. 40 His life was threatened, and the Amis des Noirs, through its liaison with him and the London Committee, was pictured as the dupe of a British plan to undermine French interests. 41 International collaboration had a tough time standing up to the powerful forces of nationalism and economic anxiety effectively exploited by the enemies of abolition. Brissot later wrote to Clarkson in his broken English that abolitionists 'must avoid to give fresh & apparent opportunities to their [enemies'] calumnies.' 42 By the time he wrote, however, their enemies in France already had as many opportunities as they needed.
Back then to our original questions. How narrowly should organizational objectives be trimmed and how important are the prospects of success in deciding on them? In the circumstances of the campaign against the slave trade, the London Committee clearly marked out much the better strategic position and organizational structure while managing to do so without serious compromise to the beliefs of its members about the evil of slavery. The Amis des Noirs, despite its protestations, did not follow its example, whether deliberately or, more likely, from a failure to appreciate the reasoning which motivated its British cousin. It became the prisoner of its original position and soon found itself, in consequence, on the political defensive.
Or, again, how close should the cooperation between national groups be, particularly when such collaboration is easily representable as cutting across powerful nationalistic or revolutionary (or anti-revolutionary) programmes? Here important tactical errors were made by both groups, and notably by Clarkson and Brissot. While the opposition was prepared to exploit any openings, there can be no doubt but that Clarkson's incautious and very public offers of financial support for the Amis des Noirs as well as his prominent leadership role in France supplied hostages to fortune. Clarkson did not display the kind of political sensitivity to possible French reactions to his role as he showed, for example, in rejecting the request to circulate a petition in Britain for presentation in France. When Brissot made his original approach to the London Committee in 1787, the Committee showed a caution which it subsequently overcame, but with little benefit in the realization of its purposes. From 1791 onwards, it ceased to go out of its way to advertise how close its relations to the Amis des Noirs were or, more significantly, had been. 43 
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